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1 Introduction
Simple two-stage games are often used to derive predictions about the eﬀects
of the intensity of competition on cost-reducing investments.1 The empir-
ical test of these predictions is very diﬃcult, and the literature comes to
ambiguous conclusions.2 Therefore, this paper uses laboratory experiments
as a complementary research strategy to explore whether at least the basic
strategic eﬀects identified in the theoretical models are present in a labora-
tory setting.
Specifically, we consider four diﬀerent games where two or four firms can
choose a cost-reducing investment before they engage in Cournot or Bertrand
competition. In this fashion, we can explore the eﬀects of increasing com-
petition both by increasing the number of players and by switching from
Cournot to Bertrand competition. Thus, we can capture two of the most fa-
miliar notions of increasing competition. The predicted eﬀect of competition
on investment is unambiguously negative for an increase in the number of
firms. For a shift from Cournot to Bertrand competition, the eﬀect is mostly
positive, except in the duopoly case for some parameter constellations, in-
cluding one of the treatments we considered.
The experiments fully confirm the negative number eﬀects.3 For a switch
from Cournot to Bertrand competition, however, the observed eﬀect is al-
ways positive, even when the predicted eﬀect is negative. This observation
relates to how players deviate from the Nash equilibrium. In both cases,
there is overinvestment. However, this overinvestment is more pronounced
in the Bertrand case, so that there may be a positive eﬀect of switching from
Cournot to Bertrand even when theory predicts a negative eﬀect.
Obviously, a simple set of experiments cannot resolve the century-old
debate about the eﬀects of competition on investment. First of all, there are
too many conceptual ambiguities at the theoretical levels. Even the definition
of increasing intensity of competition is contentious, some insightful attempts
to structure the debate notwithstanding.4 Second, even if one settles for
1Schmutzler (2007) and Vives (2008) synthesize the existing literature.
2See Gilbert (2006).
3Importantly, note that our analysis is distinct from the more familiar analysis of
number eﬀects in oligopolies (Huck et al. 2004; Orzen 2008, forthcoming). This literature
deals with the eﬀects on prices and quantities rather than on investments.
4Boone (2000) shows that many diﬀerent measures of competition share the common
property that increasing competition can be associated with a higher ratio of the profits
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a specific notion of increasing competition in two-stage games, there is a
bewildering variety of models to investigate the issue.5 Third, of course,
one can go beyond the two-sage setting and investigate more complicated
dynamic models.6 Finally, one may worry about the external validity of
the laboratory setting as a means of testing predictions about the long-term
strategic decisions of managers in (potentially large) firms.
In spite of all these cautionary remarks, we believe that the subsequent
analysis leads to one important insight: Our laboratory analysis suggests
that behavioral eﬀects may imply a more positive eﬀect of competition on
investment than a purely theoretic analysis would reveal. Future work will
have to show how robust these eﬀects are in the lab. More importantly,
perhaps, it will have to show whether the eﬀect is also present in the field.
There are only few experimental studies which directly deal with the
linkage between intensity of competition and R&D investments. Isaac and
Reynolds (1988, 1992) consider the number eﬀects. They deal with stochastic
static and dynamic patent races and show that an increase in the group size
lowers investment per firm and raises aggregate investment. We are not
aware of experimental papers comparing Cournot to Bertrand competition.
In Sacco and Schmutzler (2008), we analyze a two-stage Bertrand game,
where investments precede price competition.7 We show that overinvestment
is substantial. However, there, we do not deal with the eﬀects of increasing
competition.8
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 contains the theoretical
between more eﬃcient and less eﬃcient firms.
5Vives (2008) provides a unifying discussion of two-stage games, with the extent of
product diﬀerentation as an inverse measure of competition. Schmutzler (2007) extends
the discussion to other measures of competition.
6For instance, Lee and Wilde (1980) identify a positive eﬀect of the number of firms
on investment per firm in a Bertrand setting, whereas Delbono and Denicolò (1991) find
a negative eﬀect, even on total investment, in the Cournot case. In a stochastic patent
race preceding product market competition, Delbono and Denicolò (1990) show that in-
vestment in the Bertrand case is unambiguously higher than in the Cournot case. Bester
and Petrakis (1993) show that, with suﬃciently large horizontal product diﬀerentiation,
the innovation incentive is higher under Cournot competition than under Bertrand com-
petition.
7Suetens (2005) considers investment games in a Cournot setting. However, she is not
concerned with the eﬀects of competition.
8The theoretical part of the paper deals more generally with all-pay auctions with
negative prize externalities. The Bertrand investment game used in the experiment is a
special case of the general set-up.
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framework. Section 3 describes the experimental design and results. Section
4 concludes.
2 The Model
We analyze static two-stage games, where firms i = 1, ..., I first invest in
R&D and then compete in the product market. The demand function for
the homogenous product is given by D(p) = a−p, with a > 0. All firms i are
identical ex-ante with constant marginal costs c > 0. In the first stage, firms
simultaneously choose R&D investments Yi ∈ [0, c), resulting in marginal
costs ci = c − Yi.9 The cost of R&D is given by kY 2i , where k > 0. In
the second stage, firms simultaneously choose quantities (Cournot) or prices
(Bertrand). We refer to the Cournot case as soft competition (SC); to the
Bertrand case as intense competition (IC).
2.1 Soft Competition
For SC, backward induction shows that the net payoﬀ function of firm i in
the first stage is given by
Πi(Y1, ..., YI , α, k) =
µα+ IYi −Pi6=j Yj
I + 1
¶2
− kY 2i , (1)
where α ≡ a− c represents the demand parameter.10
The gross payoﬀ of firm i, that is, the first term on the right-hand side
of (1), depends positively on its own investment and the demand parameter,
and negatively on the investments of the other firms. Competition is soft in
the sense that even a firm that invests less than the others achieves a positive
gross payoﬀ, unless Yi ¿ Yj.
Maximizing (1) with respect to Yi yields
∂Πi(·)
∂Yi
=
2I(α+ IYi −
P
i6=j Yj)
(I + 1)2
− 2kYi ≡ 0. (2)
9Even though agents are restricted to finite strategy sets in the experiment, the theo-
retical analysis is much more transparent if the strategy set is a continuum.
10Here and in the following, we assume that α+ IYi −
P
i6=j Yj ≥ 0.
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We assume that the second order condition holds, that is,
∂2Πi(·)
∂Y 2i
=
I2
(I + 1)2
− k < 0, (3)
which is fulfilled for arbitrary I ≥ 2 if k > 1.
The equilibrium follows immediately from (2).
Proposition 1 Under SC the symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in-
vestment levels are
Y SC =
αI
k(I + 1)2 − I . (4)
By (4), equilibrium investments are increasing in the demand parameter
α, and decreasing in the cost parameter k and in the number of firms I.
2.2 Intense Competition
For IC, backward induction shows that the net payoﬀ function of firm i in
the first stage is given by
Πi(·) =
½
(Yi − Y m−i)D(c− Y m−i)− kY 2i , if Yi > Y m−i
−kY 2i , if Yi ≤ Y m−i
, (5)
where Y m−i = maxj 6=i Yj. Competition is intense in the sense that a firm can
achieve a positive gross payoﬀ only by investing more than the highest in-
vestment of the others. If Yi > Y m−i , maximizing (5) with respect to Yi gives
∂Πi(·)
∂Yi
= D(c− Y mj )− 2kYi ≡ 0. (6)
Yi ≤ Y m−i can only be a best response if Yi = 0 holds: If firm i does not
invest more than all others, it gets a negative net payoﬀ. In such a case
the deviation to Yi = 0 is profitable. The pure-strategy equilibrium is thus
characterized as follows.
Proposition 2 (i) Under IC, for k > 1
2
, there are multiple asymmetric pure-
strategy equilibria with one firm investing Y ICi =
α
2k and firms j 6= i investing
Y ICj = 0. (ii) There are no other pure-strategy equilibria.
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Proof. (i) If firms j 6= i invest Y ICj = 0, then according to (6) the best
response of firm i is Y ICi =
α
2k for any k > 0. If firm i invests Y
IC
i =
α
2k ,
then the best response of the other firms is Y ICj = 0 for k >
1
2
. That is, firm
j does not have an incentive to exceed the investment of firm i by choosing
Y ICj =
α
2k +∆, where ∆ > 0. The value ∆ =
α
4k2 maximizes Πj(·) which is
negative for k > 1
2
.
(ii) is immediate.
Thus, the average equilibrium investment level is given by
Y
IC
=
α
2kI
, (7)
which is increasing in the demand parameter, and decreasing in the cost
parameter k and in the number of firms I.
It is unlikely that agents can coordinate on one of the asymmetric pure-
strategy equilibria, in particular, because only the investor obtains positive
payoﬀs. In the experimental analysis, we therefore refer to the following
result of Sacco and Schmutzler (2008).
Proposition 3 The IC-game has a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium,
where firms mix between all strategies up to a cut-oﬀ level.
In the companion paper, we also provide an algorithm for calculating this
equilibrium.11
2.3 The Eﬀects of Increasing Competition
We now show that, with a small qualification for the comparison between SC
and IC, the predicted eﬀects of competition on investment are negative.
Corollary 1 For a given type of product market competition, SC or IC, the
average equilibrium investments are decreasing in I.
Similarly, comparing (4) to (7), the following result arises.
Corollary 2 Suppose that (3) holds and k > 1
2
. The average equilibrium
investment for SC is higher than the average investment in each asymmetric
pure-strategy equilibrium for IC unless I = 2 and k > 2.
11The game also has asymmetric mixed-strategy equilibria where some firms always play
zero and others randomize.
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Though we cannot provide such a result for the mixed-strategy equilib-
rium at this level of generality, a similar statement holds for the parameters
we choose (see 3.1).
Thus, except for the caveat for I = 2, for both concepts of competitive-
ness, an increase in competition reduces investment.
3 The Experiment
3.1 Choosing the Parameters
We conducted four treatments. There were two sessions with two-player
groups (SC2 and IC2) and four-player groups (SC4 and IC4), respectively.12
Further, we chose α = 30 and k = 3. In the experiments, we restricted the
strategy sets to Yi ∈ {0, 1, ..., 9}. It can be shown that the equilibria of the
game with the discrete strategy set are (2, 2) for SC2 and (2, 2, 2, 2) for SC4.
However, this prediction relies on an extremely mechanical application of the
Nash equilibrium. It is straightforward to show that marginal investment
incentives are higher for each player in SC2 than in SC4. Economic intuition
therefore suggests that the eﬀect of increasing the number of players should
be negative.13 This prediction is obtained if one views the players as playing
a continuous game: In the Nash equilibrium of the continuous version of SC2,
investments are higher than for SC4 (2.4 > 1.69).
Under IC, according to Proposition 2, there are asymmetric equilibria,
each with one firm investing 5 and the other firm(s) 0. This holds both for
the discrete and continuous strategy set. Moreover, according to Sacco and
Schmutzler (2008), IC2 has a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium (MSE)
given by
(p0, ..., p9) = (0.1, 0.193, 0.187, 0.182, 0.176, 0.160, 0, 0, 0, 0) . (8)
For IC4, the symmetric MSE is given by
(p0, ..., p9) = (0.464, 0.2, 0.119, 0.088, 0.071, 0.057, 0, 0, 0, 0) . (9)
12The results for IC2 are also reported in Sacco and Schmutzler (2008).
13Schmutzler (2007) formalizes this intuition. He gives general conditions under which
an increase in the number of players (weakly) reduces the investments of players in an
investment game. These conditions hold in the example.
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The expected investment level is 2.62 for IC2 and 1.27 for IC4.14
3.2 Experimental Design and Procedures
The experimental sessions were conducted in June and November 2006 at
the University of Zurich. The participants were undergraduate students.15
To focus on investment choices, we reduced the games to the first stage, that
is, to the investment stage. For each investment profile, players earned the
unique Nash equilibrium payoﬀs of the corresponding subgame. Thus, we
did not model the product market stage explicitly.16 This allows us to avoid
confusion about the source of possible deviations from the equilibrium in the
investment game: Contrary to a two-stage experiment, investment decisions
cannot be influenced by speculations about deviations from equilibria in the
product-market stage.17
We implemented two sessions with IC treatments, and two with SC treat-
ments. In each session there were 20 periods and in two of four sessions 36
subjects.18 This led to a total of 2760 investment observations. No sub-
ject participated in more than one session. The participants were randomly
matched into groups of size two or four after each period. This corresponds
to a Stranger design.19 At the end of each period, subjects were informed
about the investment level of the other group member(s) and their own net
payoﬀ for that period. In each session, participants received an initial en-
dowment of CHF 35 (≈EUR 22). Average earnings including the endowment
were CHF 31 (≈EUR 19) for IC2 and CHF 32.50 (≈EUR 20) for IC4. The
amounts for SC2 and SC4 were CHF 49 (≈EUR 31) and CHF 39 (≈EUR
24), respectively. Sessions lasted about 90 minutes each. The experiment was
programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
14Note that the expected investment levels are close to the average investments (Y
IC2
=
2.5; Y
IC4
= 1.25).
15We did not exclude any disciplines. We had students of law, engineering, psychology,
economics etc.
16A similar strategy was pursued in the Cournot investment experiments of Halbheer
et al. (2007). Sacco (2008) compares the behavior of subjects in a two-stage experiment
with behavior in the corresponding reduced-form game.
17Such deviations are known to arise both in the Bertrand case (Dufwenberg and Gneezy,
2000) and in the the Cournot case (Huck et al. 2004, and many others).
18In the SC4 and IC2 sessions there were 32 and 34 participants, respectively.
19Observe that through the choice of a Stranger design the experimental analysis is
based on one-shot considerations.
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3.3 Results
Based on the results of sections 2.3 and 3.1, we test the following hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1 Investments are lower in SC4 than in SC2.
Hypothesis 2 Investments are lower in IC4 than in IC2.
Hypothesis 3 (a) Investments are lower in IC4 than in SC4. (b) Investments
are higher in IC2 than in SC2.
That is, we first consider the eﬀects of increasing the number of players.
The analysis of the SC treatment (Hypothesis 1) precedes that of the IC
treatment (Hypothesis 2). Second, for a given number of players, we consider
the eﬀects of switching from SC to IC (Hypothesis 3).
3.3.1 Soft Competition
The mean investments over all periods and subjects are 2.59 and 1.83 for
SC2 and SC4, respectively. These are slightly above, but very close to the
equilibria of the continuous version of the SC game. Hence, in spite of the
discrete formulation of the game, the continuous game may provide better
predictions than the discrete game, which, to repeat, predicts average in-
vestments of 2 in both cases. This point is interesting beyond the specific
game.
Result 1 Mean investments are higher for SC2 than for SC4.
Considering all periods, both a regression over a constant and a Wilcoxon
rank sum test show that the diﬀerence between the two treatments is highly
significant (p < 0.01). This also holds in the last five periods. That is, the
mean investment level under SC2 does not converge to that under SC4.
Figure 1 reveals that there is overinvestment for SC2 and underinvestment
for SC4 if one takes the equilibrium of the discrete game as the benchmark.20
Relative to the equilibrium of the continuous game, there is overinvestment
20In SC2, the diﬀerence between investments and Nash equilibrium is highly significant
over all periods. This also holds in the last five periods. In SC4, the diﬀerence with respect
to the prediction is likewise highly significant throughout the 20 periods. Interestingly,
this also holds in the last five but not in the first five periods.
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Figure 1: Mean investments under SC.
in both cases. Over all periods, the diﬀerence between observed investments
and corresponding continuous benchmark is highly significant. However, in
the last five periods, the diﬀerence is significant only for SC4 (p = 0.017).
While the main objective of this subsection was the test of Hypothesis
1, we also note in passing that investments are concentrated around the
equilibrium (see Figure 2).
Result 2 For SC2, 77% of the investments over all periods are either 2 or
3. For SC4, 80% of the investments are either 1 or 2.
Also, the concentration around the equilibrium arises in almost every
single period.21
Finally, the concentration of investments around the equilibrium is also
reflected in the average investments of each player.
For each interval of length 1, Table 1 gives the number of subjects whose
average investment is in the interval. For SC2, 28 of the 36 subjects choose
21Under SC2, the investment level of 2 is chosen most often in 17 periods, followed by 3.
In the remaining three periods, 3 is the most frequently played investment level, followed
by 2. Under SC4, again in 17 periods, 2 is chosen most often, followed by 1. In the other
three periods, 1 is played most often, followed by 2.
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Figure 2: Investment distributions under SC.
Table 1: Subject distributions under SC.
Interval [0, 1) [1, 2) [2, 3) [3, 4) [4, 5) [5, 6) [6, 7) [7, 8) [8, 9]
SC2 0 1 28 6 1 0 0 0 0
SC4 2 20 9 1 0 0 0 0 0
mean investments over the 20 periods between 2 and 3. For SC4, 20 of the
32 subjects have mean investments between 1 and 2.
The observed deviations from the Nash equilibrium are strikingly diﬀer-
ent from those in standard Cournot oligopoly games where players choose
outputs rather than investments. These games are structurally very simi-
lar to the reduced version of the investment game, in that they also feature
strategic substitutes and negative externalities. Hence, in the Nash equilib-
rium, players choose more output than under joint-profit maximization. In
experiments with few players, subjects collude, that is, choose output levels
below the Nash equilibrium and closer to joint-profit maximization. For more
players, this result is reversed; output is even higher than predicted in the
Nash equilibrium (Huck et al., 2004). Thus, more intense competition leads
to less cooperative behavior. For our investment games, this is no longer
true, no matter whether one uses the discrete or the continuous game as a
10
benchmark. Relative to the former benchmark, the Huck et al. (2004) results
are reversed: Players choose too high levels of the non-cooperative action for
SC2, but too low levels for SC4. Relative to the latter benchmark, actions
are too high for both SC2 and SC4.
3.3.2 Intense Competition
Next, we consider Hypothesis 2, which is based on the result that the ex-
pected investment level in the MSE for IC2 (2.62) is higher than for IC4
(1.27). The experiment provides evidence for this prediction.
Result 3 Mean investments are higher for IC2 than for IC4.
0
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IC2 MSE (IC2) IC4 MSE (IC4)
Figure 3: Mean investments under IC.
Figure 3 reveals that the mean investment level under IC2 does not ap-
proach the one under IC4. The diﬀerence between the two treatments is
highly significant over all periods, and even in the last ten or the last five
periods.22
22This holds both for a Wilcoxon rank sum test and for a regression over a constant.
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Figure 3 also shows that, both under IC2 and IC4, the mean investments
over the 20 periods always lie above the MSE values of 2.62 and 1.27, re-
spectively. In IC2, the diﬀerence between investments and the MSE is highly
significant throughout the 20 periods. This still holds in the last ten or the
last five periods. That is, there is no convergence to the Nash equilibrium
value of 2.62, even though the investments in the first ten periods are signif-
icantly higher than those in the last ten periods (Wilcoxon rank sum test,
p = 0.016).
In IC4, considering all periods, a regression over a constant shows that the
diﬀerence between investments and the MSE is highly significant, whereas
a Wilcoxon rank sum test indicates high significance only in the first five
periods (p = 0.01).23 However, the investments in the first ten periods are
not significantly higher than those in the last ten periods (Wilcoxon rank
sum test, p = 0.146). Again, there is no convergence to the MSE value of
1.27. In the last five periods, a Wilcoxon rank sum test shows significance
at the 4%-level.
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Figure 4: Deviation from the equilibrium under IC.
Inspection of Figure 4 shows that, in IC2 and IC4, the percentage devi-
ations from the theoretical predictions are similar in most periods. Over all
23The heterogeneity of investment choices under IC4 explains this discrepance.
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periods, the diﬀerence between the two treatments is not significant.
Having provided support for the comparative statics result (Hypothesis
2), we now investigate to which extent the asymmetric pure-strategy equi-
libria and the symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium predict behavior within
each IC treatment. In both treatments, the investments that are part of
the asymmetric pure-strategy equilibria stand out. Even though, unsurpris-
ingly, the players do not coordinate perfectly on such an equilibrium, the two
equilibrium strategies are played particularly often.
Result 4 For IC2, the frequency distribution exhibits a global maximum at 5.
There is a local maximum at 0. For IC4, the frequency distribution exhibits
a global maximum at 0. There is a local maximum at 5.
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Figure 5: Investment distribution under IC2.
Figure 5 shows that, in IC2, the investment level of 5 is played in 24% and
that of 0 in 15% of the cases. Figure 6 shows that, in IC4, the corresponding
percentages are 17% and 43%. These qualitative properties show up clearly
in almost every individual period.24
24For IC2, in 19 periods, the investment distribution exhibits a global maximum at 4 or
5. In 15 periods, there is a local maximum at 0. For IC4, in each period, the investment
distribution exhibits a global maximum at 0 and a local maximum at 4 or 5.
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The next results concerns the relation to the MSE.
Result 5 For IC2 and IC4, the MSE predicts the percentage of zero invest-
ments very well, but underpredicts the percentage of subjects who choose high
investments.
In both cases, low non-zero investments are chosen much less than pre-
dicted, and high investments more often. Figure 6 reveals that the MSE
predicts the percentage of zero investments very well. However, also for IC4,
overinvestment is substantial. The investment levels of 0, 1, and 2 are chosen
less often than predicted; those from 3 to 9 more often than predicted.
Interval [0, 1) [1, 2) [2, 3) [3, 4) [4, 5) [5, 6) [6, 7) [7, 8) [8, 9]
IC2 1 1 6 6 11 6 2 1 0
IC4 8 9 7 4 7 1 0 0 0
Table 2: Subject distributions under IC.
Table 2 shows that the heterogeneity of investments reflects heterogeneity
across players. For IC2, except that there is no local maximum in [0, 1), the
distribution of the average investments is similar to the distribution of Figure
14
5. For IC4, except for the fact that the global maximum arises in [1, 2) instead
of [0, 1), the distribution is similar to that of Figure 6.
To sum up, the number eﬀects predicted by Hypothesis 2 are reflected
quite well in the data. The point predictions of both types of equilibria
are imperfect. Roughly speaking, the observed behavior corresponds to a
mix between the symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium and the asymmetric
pure-strategy equilibrium.
3.3.3 Soft versus Intense Competition
We now turn to Hypothesis 3. We shall show that investments are higher in
both IC treatments than in the corresponding SC treatments, even though
the MSE predicts this only for SC2, in which case the equilibrium investments
both for the discrete (2) and continuous benchmark (2.4) are lower than
for the MSE under IC2 (2.62). The experiment provides evidence for this
prediction.
Result 6 As predicted, mean investments are higher for IC2 than for SC2.
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Figure 7: Mean investments for IC2 and SC2.
Over all periods, the diﬀerence between mean investments in IC2 and SC2
is highly significant. Figure 7 shows that the mean investment level under
15
IC2 does not approach the one under SC2. Even in the last five periods, the
diﬀerence remains highly significant.
While the comparative statics observation is consistent with equilibrium
behavior, Figure 7 reveals that the higher investment in IC2 is reinforced by
behavioral eﬀects. In each period, overinvestment, measured as the percent-
age by which mean investments exceed the corresponding equilibrium value,
is greater in IC2 than in SC2. The diﬀerence is highly significant when taking
into account either all periods or the last five periods.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
1 5 10 15 20
Period
Pe
rc
en
t
IC2 SC2
Figure 8: Deviation from the equilibrium for IC2 and SC2.
Interestingly, in the four-player case, the behavioral eﬀects are so strong
that they overturn the comparative statics prediction of Hypothesis 3, which
was based on the observation that the equilibrium investments both for the
continuous (1.69) and discrete benchmark (2) in SC4 are higher than for the
MSE in IC4 (1.27).
Result 7 Contrary to the prediction, mean investments are higher for IC4
than for SC4.
Figure 9 shows that, except for period 18 and 19, the mean investment
level is higher in IC4 than in SC4. Taking into account all periods, a regres-
sion over a constant shows that the diﬀerence between the two treatments is
highly significant. However, a Wilcoxon rank sum test indicates significance
16
at the 10%-level only in the first ten periods. Mean investments under IC4
seem to converge to those under SC4. However, a regression over a con-
stant and a Wilcoxon rank sum test lead to diﬀerent results. Considering
the last five periods, the former shows no significant diﬀerence between the
two treatments, whereas the latter exhibits significance at the 4%-level.25
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Figure 9: Mean investments for IC4 and SC4.
To sum up, investments are higher for IC than for SC, even in the four-
player case where this does not correspond to the Nash prediction. Essen-
tially, this results because the tendency to overinvest is more pronounced for
IC than for SC.
3.3.4 The Eﬃciency of Investments
It is intuitively clear that the tendency to invest more than in the Nash
equilibrium cannot be beneficial for firms. In this section, we measure the
eﬃciency relative to joint profit maximization (JPM). Of course, this eﬃ-
ciency notion only considers the firms’ interest. If consumers’ interests were
25Again, due to the heterogeneity of the investment choices, which is generally more
pronounced for IC than for SC, the statistical analysis is not unique.
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taken into account, the overinvestment would have to be interpreted as an
eﬃciency-increasing deviation from the Nash equilibrium.
For IC, the maximal joint net payoﬀ is achieved in each asymmetric pure-
strategy equilibrium;26 for SC, the joint profit maximization benchmark im-
plies lower investments than the Nash equilibrium. Intuitively, investments
impose a negative externality on the other players.27 In all treatments, play-
ers overinvest relative to the JPM. To measure the extent of deviation from
JPM, consider the eﬃciency rate (ER), defined as
ER =
Mean Joint Net Payoﬀ
Maximal Joint Net Payoﬀ
.
The ER considers the joint net payoﬀ over all periods and groups in
relation to the maximal joint net payoﬀ. For IC, negative values emerge,
which reflect the ineﬃciency resulting from overbidding. Under IC2, a value
of −0.69 arises; under IC4, −0.87. The participants made losses over the
20 periods. In IC2, 22 of the 34 subjects earned a negative net payoﬀ in at
least 14 periods. In IC4, 13 of the 36 subjects earned a negative net payoﬀ
in at least 13 periods. No subject earned more than the initial endowment
at the end of the IC sessions. On the other hand, the SC cases are relatively
eﬃcient. The SC2 treatment leads to an ER of 0.91. For SC4, the value is
0.77. Each participant earned more than the initial endowment.
4 Conclusion
This paper has analyzed the eﬀects of more intense competition on invest-
ments in an experiment where a reduced form version of a simple two-stage
R&D model has been implemented. In the first stage, firms whose marginal
costs are identical ex-ante simultaneously invest in R&D. The investment
leads to a decrease in marginal costs. In the second stage of the game, firms
simultaneously choose quantities or prices in a homogenous good market.
When more intense competition is modeled as an increase of the number
of firms for a given type of product market competition, the theoretical pre-
diction is that, both for SC and IC, an increase in the number of agents yields
26As that this equilibrium strategy has one player investing and considering that this
player maximizes his own net payoﬀ by choosing the investment level of 5, it follows that
also the joint net payoﬀ is maximal.
27For SC2, it can be shown that the maximal joint net payoﬀ arises when the two players
choose the investment level of 1; under SC4, when one player chooses 1 and the others 0.
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lower mean investments. This hypothesis is confirmed in the lab. When more
intense competition is modeled as a switch from Cournot to Bertrand compe-
tition, the observed investments increase, even though the MSE only predicts
this in the two-player case.
An important limitation of our analysis concerns the very long run. As
overinvestment tends to coincide with negative earnings in the IC game,
it is not sustainable. Thus, in the very long run, firms must either adapt
their behavior or they will disappear from the market. This feature is much
less pronounced in the SC game, where overinvestment is compatible with
positive earnings. One might therefore conjecture that, in the long run,
whereas overinvestment remains in the SC case, it disappears in the IC case.
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